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Abstract This article examines the effects of multiculturalism of the 1980s and
1990s on the organisational patterns of immigrant populations in the Netherlands.
This is a controversial topic in this country since politics of multiculturalism have
allegedly excessively sponsored migrant organisations causing their ‘fragmentation’
and having adverse consequences for these organisations’ role in the integration
process. Based upon a systematic survey of the available data about postcolonial
migrant organisations from 1945 to 2008, our conclusion is that the growth in
postcolonial migrant organisations from the 1980s onwards has been impressive. For
this specific category of immigrants, there is, however, little in the way of evidence
that links this growth, or fragmentation of the landscape of migrant organisations for
that matter, to Dutch multicultural minorities policies. Much of the growth should be
related to the global phenomena of emerging identity discourses and increasing
levels of identity politics. The policy implication is that, at least for the Netherlands,
government policies creating favourable conditions for migrant organisations have
been discarded without proper justification as counterproductive.
Keywords Multiculturalism .Migrant organisations . Opportunity structures . Social
capital . Postcolonialism
In 1979, the Dutch government acknowledged that racial and ethnic diversity would
be a permanent feature of the Netherlands. To address this multi-ethnic future, a
‘minorities policy’ was formulated that was moderately multicultural in nature
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) 1979, xviii; Ministerie van
Binnenlandse Zaken 1981). One of the key objectives of the policy was to encourage
immigrants from non-western backgrounds to organise themselves. This was a
response to the perceived dangers of political and social exclusion. However, the role
of migrant organisations came under increasing criticism during the 1990s, when
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government policies shifted their focus to improving education, and thereby job
opportunities, for individual migrants. Particularly since 2001, migrant organisations
have taken part of the blame for what has become known in the Netherlands as the
‘multicultural drama’ (Scheffer 2000). Since Scheffer’s publication, the Dutch
discourse on multiculturalism took a turn to a ‘new realism’ (Prins 2002).
Doubts about the positive role of migrant organisations in the emancipation of
newcomers are based upon the assumption that Dutch multicultural policies have
fostered organisational fragmentation, leading to a proliferation of small politically
powerless associations, fostering segregation rather than social and political
incorporation. This view was most notably expressed by Koopmans (Koopmans
2002).1 In comparing the effects of policies for social integration in a number of
European countries, Statham and Koopmans comment on Dutch integration policies
that: ‘Too much state sponsorship for multiculturalism appeared to have led to the
fragmentation of migrant communities along ever smaller ethnic and religious group
lines, resulting in an institutionalization of inequality’ (Koopmans et al. 2005, 245).2
This perspective is clearly contradicted by a number of research projects and
publications of the Institute of Ethnic and Migration Studies (IMES) at the
University of Amsterdam, which stress the importance of ethnic associations and
their capacity to sustain civil society (Fennema 2004; Penninx and Van Heelsum
2004; Penninx and Schrover 2001). Vermeulen’s findings on Surinamese and Turkish
immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin underscore that ‘fragmentation’
can easily be compensated by a high degree of connectivity between organisations
(Vermeulen 2006, 160–161). A North-American variant of this IMES position might
be Bloemraad’s structured mobilisation approach, ‘which views political incorpora-
tion as a social process of mobilisation by friends, family, community organisations
and local leaders that is embedded in an institutional context shaped by government
policies of diversity and newcomer settlement’ (Bloemraad 2006a: 667).
The complexity of the relationship between government policies and numbers of
immigrant organisations also appears from Vermeulen’s findings on the Surinamese
and Turkish organisations in the Netherlands (Vermeulen 2006, 159–160). These
findings suggest that the degree of (pre-migration) ethnic and religious diversity
within migrant groups is a particularly important determinant in the initial phase of
settlement that heavily interacts with opportunity structures. This is apparently in
line with the organisation ecology model of Hannan and Freeman which submits that
during the first phase of the organising process an increase in new organisations
enlarges their legitimacy and makes it easier for others to start a new organisation.
Once the density of the population of organisations has risen to its carrying capacity
in terms of available resources (government sponsorship, potential membership, etc.)
the number of newly established organisations declines. Elaborating and also slightly
reworking this theory, Minkoff argues that a higher organisational density improves
the individual organisation’s chance of survival, making them less vulnerable to
institutional changes but also acts as a basis for new organisational initiatives
1 Koopman’s argument was criticised for not presenting the full picture by Böcker and Thränhardt (2003).
2 Their view is criticised by Engelen and Kastoryano who both claim that by focusing their research on
discussions in national newspaper, Koopmans et al. fail to notice the agency of migrant organisations, who
are mainly politically active at a local level (Engelen 2008, 131; Kastoryano 2008, 135).
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(Minkoff 1995, 122–124). This way the organisational ecology model can explain
both the organisations tendency to grow in numbers as well as their increasing
connectivity (Vermeulen 2006, 162–163).
No doubt, the theory of organisational ecology provides us with important
insights into the complex dynamics of migrant organisations. But it has its
limitations, one of which is that it does not take on board the historical dimension.
The point to be made here is that the curve in organisational density postulated by
the theory of organisational ecology at least covers 30 years, in which both on the
side of receiving society and its opportunity structures as well as on the side of the
immigrants a lot might change. An often underrated factor is the historical context in
which migrant organisations develop their identity politics. Following Calhoun we
define identity politics as the aim for public recognition of ethnic, cultural and
religious differences and the fulfilment of specific and culturally defined needs
(Calhoun 1994, 20–26). Identity discourses and identity politics that emerged
together with the concept of multiculturalism in the 1980s, for example, belong to a
specific moment in history that was a.o. fostered by an increasing level of global
interaction. This may have influenced identity politics of the migrant organisations
even stronger than national integration policies, and this may hold true for the
Netherlands in particular.
The relationship between postcolonial immigration and the introduction of
multiculturalism in the Dutch integration politics provides a case in point to test
the assumption that multicultural policies have led to a proliferation of migrant
organisations (Bosma 2009, 241). The data collection and research on which this
article is based were part of a broader research programme into the history of
postcolonial immigration and the status of the Netherlands as a postcolonial society.3
Confronted by mounting ethnic tensions and even violence attending the arrival and
settlement of groups of postcolonial immigrants in the late 1970s, the Dutch
government adopted a policy that was to a certain extent inspired by Canadian
multiculturalism (Campfens 1979). In spite of that, and in contrast to Great Britain,
Australia and Canada, the uneasy but nonetheless crucial relationship between
multiculturalism and postcolonialism has hardly attracted public or even academic
attention (Gunew 1997). This lack of recognition of the postcolonial condition of the
Netherlands may explain the rather uncritical use of the word ‘fragmentation’ by
Statham and Koopmans to label complex processes of identity politics and their
interaction with government policies.
This article is based upon data provided by a systematic survey of migrant
organisations established by newcomers who came from the former Dutch colonies;
they represent about 40% of all post-War immigrants from outside Europe. Although
these data concern only one particular segment of the Dutch immigrant population,
they provide sufficient basis for our purpose of testing the assumption that Dutch
government policies have led to a fragmentation of migrant organisations. This
assumption was after all not qualified for particular categories of immigrants. The
data cover 60 years, stretching from the first repatriates from Indonesia in the 1940s
to the Antilleans who arrived in large numbers in the 1990s. Before we present our
3 See, http://www.narcis.info/research/RecordID/OND1316889/Language/nl
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research results, we will first briefly describe the groups concerned and our research
methods.
The Groups Involved: Indische, Moluccan, Surinamese, and Antillean/Aruban
In the Netherlands, 6.3% of the population comes from the former colonies or has at
least one parent born there. These people migrated in roughly three different waves.
Between 1945 and 1956, almost 90% of the Dutch citizens who lived in Indonesia,
about 300,000 individuals, migrated to the Netherlands. More than 60% of them
were born in the former colony and were often of partly Indonesian descent. In this
paper we use ‘Indische Netherlanders’ for Dutch citizens born in Indonesia and
‘repatriates’ for metropolitan Dutch people who came back from Indonesia after
1945. In addition to the Dutch citizens migrating from Indonesia in 1951, 4,000
Moluccan colonial soldiers arrived in the Netherlands after they had refused to be
demobilised on Indonesian territory. Together with their 8,000 wives and children,
they were ordered to embark for the Netherlands and discharged just before
debarkation in Rotterdam (Smeets and Steijlen 2006, 67, 79). They were loyal to the
Moluccan Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan) that was created in 1950 and
subsequently crushed by the Indonesian state, although a small guerrilla movement
managed to survive until 1966. In the 1970s, about 180,000 immigrants came from
Suriname and from the 1980s onwards another 90,000 arrived from the Antilles and
Aruba (Fig. 1).
According to Alba and Nee (2003, 216) there are four main indicators of
integration: acculturation and language, assimilation, socio-economic attainment,
spatial patterns and social relations (measured by intermarriage). As far as language
is concerned, the processes of settlement for the postcolonial immigrants were
preceded by extensive colonial migration circuits. In the nineteenth century,
travelling was confined to the mostly well-educated elites. In the twentieth century,
these colonial migration circuits expanded rapidly, particularly among the more
educated people. The first groups of post-war immigrants were also relatively well








































Fig. 1 Adapted from, Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics
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Indonesia between 1945 and 1949 had an academic education (Kraak et al. 1958,
226). Likewise, until the early 1960s about 10% of the Surinamese residents in the
Netherlands had an academic education or higher vocational training and until the
early 1980s 16% of the Antillean immigrants were also well educated (Van Niekerk
2002, 23). The level of education in immigrants declined as the influxes of the
respective immigrant groups became much larger, which, of course, was a source
of concern for the Dutch authorities. In the 1950s, the Dutch government was
reluctant to admit Indische Netherlanders, particularly if they had never lived in the
Netherlands. Likewise, in the early 1970s the Dutch government tried to stop the
increasing numbers of Surinamese immigrants by expediting the independence of
Suriname. In both cases, the attempts to stem the migration influxes had little
effect.
As far as work (social-economic attainment) is considered, conditions changed
fundamentally over time. A crucial aspect of this was the changing role of the state
in the economic sphere. Whereas the government intervened in the labour market on
behalf of the repatriates from the newly independent Indonesia in the 1940s, in the
1980s and 1990s the integration of immigrants into the labour market was left to
market forces, the employers and labour unions (Van Amersfoort and van Niekerk
2006). The impact of this withdrawal was enormous, especially as in the 1980s the
Netherlands was suffering from a severe economic crisis and deindustrialisation. In
other spheres of housing (spatial patterns) a drastic change also took place. The
central co-ordination of housing and welfare provision that had been in place when
the Indonesian repatriates had arrived was disintegrating by the 1970s, precisely
when the Surinamese were migrating in large numbers. The Indische Netherlanders
are rather dispersed over the country, whereas Surinamese and Antillean migrants
were concentrated in the large cities. Moluccans had been housed in separate
districts in about 60 villages.
Taking intermarriage as a parameter of integration, it appears that the affinity of
postcolonial migrants for Dutch society is converging over time, and is stronger than
that felt by labour migrants. Generally, intermarriage into the autochthonous Dutch
population occurs much more frequently among postcolonial migrants than among
labour migrants from Morocco and Turkey who started to settle in the Netherlands
from the late 1970s onwards (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) 2007, 39). In the
1950s, more than half of the Indische Netherlanders married outside their own group
(Willems 2001, 201). This figure was slightly lower for the Moluccans. According to
figures from the 1960s only about one third of them married into autochthonous
Dutch society. This difference can be easily explained by their isolated housing in
barracks—and later on in separate residential areas in Dutch villages and towns—
and the long upheld ideal of a return to the Moluccas. At present about one third of
the Surinamese and 50% of the Antilleans are married to autochthonous Dutch
people. For the second generation, the percentages are considerably higher than for
the first (Table 1).
The postcolonial immigrants had different levels of education and different
degrees of affinity for Dutch culture, and almost all of them were legally Dutch
citizens, with the exception of the Moluccans. Many Moluccans had refused to apply
for Dutch citizenship during their exile in the Netherlands and about 80% did not
have a Dutch passport in the 1970s (Jones 2007, 129). The Surinamese, the Afro-
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Surinamese in particular, and the Indische Netherlanders were the most proficient in
Dutch, whereas the Antilleans had the least affinity for Dutch language and culture.
The postcolonial migrants have long-term relationships with the Dutch state, and
also with Dutch society, however strained and painful these may be. The immigrants
from Indonesia could count on the solidarity of their relatives in the Netherlands, the
Dutch society at large, and were able to help each other. For example, former key
figures of the Dutch empire had not forgotten that the ‘Ambonese’—the name the
Moluccans were given in the colonial army—had served the Dutch in Indonesia for
three centuries. The political relationship with the metropolitan state was quite
different for the postcolonial immigrants from the West who were the descendants of
slaves and indentured labourers. As a consequence, over the past 60 years the
political orientations of the postcolonial migrant organisations in the Netherlands
have run the full gamut from colonial revanchism to communism and Black Power.
However, all the organisations held grievances against the Dutch government and
society.
The Second World War and the subsequent decolonisation process were deeply
traumatic experiences for many postcolonial migrants from Indonesia. Moreover
they, and this pertains to the colonial civil servants in particular, had substantial
financial claims. In the early 1950s, they pressured the Dutch government into
rescuing their pensions, the responsibility for which had been transferred to an
unwilling Republic of Indonesia. Another issue was that during the Japanese
occupation of Indonesia the majority of the Dutch men (as well as the women and
children) had been interned and during these years their salary payments had been
discontinued. The backpay of these salaries has never taken place, which is still a
bone of contention between the Dutch government and the, now elderly, former
Dutch civil servants of colonial Indonesia.
Mapping Migrant Organisations
To determine how postcolonial immigrant groups articulated themselves through
organisations, we can rely on methods developed by Jean Tillie and Meindert
Fennema at the IMES in Amsterdam (Fennema and Tillie 1997). Various research
projects at this institute have focused on Dutch immigrant organisations. In the
Netherlands most of these organisations can be found in the registers of the national
Table 1 Postcolonial immigrants in the Netherlands, 1st and 2nd generations (2006)
First generation Second generation Total
Indische Netherlanders and Dutch repatriates 204,000 315,000 519,000
Moluccan 26,000 32,349 58,349
Surinamese 187,483 144,417 331,900
Antillean and Aruban 80,102 49,581 129,683
Total 497,585 540,868 1,038,932
For Suriname and the Antilles (including Aruba), see Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. For
Indische Dutch and Moluccans, see Beets et al. (2002)
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Chambers of Commerce. The great majority of migrant organisations took a formal
status in order to start a bank account and rent a location for their activities. In
addition to using the registers of the Chambers of Commerce, we have also made an
extensive search using the Internet and the abundantly available secondary literature—
particularly to trace older organisations that have already disappeared—as well as
primary sources. A selection of the secondary literature searched is listed on the website
that presents the database, and which can be consulted at www.iisg.nl/research/
migrantenorganisaties.php.4 An extensive bibliography is included in the Dutch
language book by Bosma (Bosma 2009, 403–434)
We have found almost 2,600 organisations that can be attributed to the various
postcolonial immigrant groups. About 80% of these organisations were registered
with the Chambers of Commerce; the remaining 20% are mostly churches, informal
organisations, website groups and so on. We did not apply a particular definition of
an ‘organisation’ to our search, although in practice we looked for groups that enter
the public sphere and proclaim themselves to be an organisation with stated
objectives.
In spite of the fact that we cannot catch all the fish in the pond, we think that our
database of postcolonial migrant organisations allows us to compare between
immigrant groups and provides the necessary data to analyse the interactions
between government policies and the developing landscape of immigrant organ-
isations. The database also enables us to describe the evolution of the organisational
landscape of the postcolonial immigrants over time. We have the dates of
establishment for about 92% of the 2,600 organisations and we know whether the
organisations still exist. We do not have consistent information, however, on the
exact dates of dissolution for those organisations that have disappeared.5 This is a
disadvantage in terms of establishing the development of organisational density of
migrant organisations over time. This partly explains why we have based our
analysis on the growth or decline of the numbers of newly established organisations
rather than on the number of organisations at any given moment. In addition, we
have categorised these organisations both according to group-specific markers as
well as through objectives. Group-specific markers are country of origin, ethnicity,
religion, ‘youth’, ‘elderly’ and ‘women’ while objectives cover areas of interest such
as ‘welfare’, ‘heritage’, ‘religious facilities’, ‘sport’ and so on. This categorisation
was done through our own research and was double-checked with representatives of
migrant organisations.
We have not made a distinction between organisations that were established by
immigrants themselves and those established by other agencies working on their
behalf. In fact, government sponsored agencies such as the community development
and welfare foundations, played an important role in the 1970s as voices for the
Surinamese and Antillean newcomers and the Moluccans (WRR 1979, 173). Another
deviation from what is customary in this type of research, and from similar projects
at IMES in particular, is that our research does not apply network analysis to
5 For 99.5% of the 2,068 organisations that are registered with the Chambers, we have the dates of
foundation. Of the 452 (13 June 2008) organisations that are not registered we have 244 dates of
establishment. So far, we have discovered that 1% of the organisations traced in the registers of the
Chambers of Commerce existed for years before they were registered.
4 A full reference list is offered by the bibliography of Bosma, Terug uit de koloniën.
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establish the level of collaboration (connectivity) between migrant organisations
(Tillie and Fennema 1997; Fennema 2004). In our research, we did, however, place
the organisations on a scale illustrating their position in terms of national, regional
and local significance, and made the assumption that the national organisations
include certain levels of bonding between migrant organisations. Moreover,
changing opportunity structures and differences in social capital have had a distinct
impact upon the scale of operations, as we will show. To a certain extent, the scale
and number of organisations are inversely correlated.
The patterns of migrant organisations follow their own rhythm as Van Heelsum
has demonstrated at the basis of her research into a great many migrant organisations
in the Netherlands (Van Heelsum 2004). The number of new organisations is at a
peak in the early years of settlement for any migrant group (Hannan and Freeman
1989, 243). This already partly explains the rise of Surinamese organisations in the
1970s and the rising number of Antillean organisations by the end of the 1990s.
Fifteen to 20 years after the settlement process the goal of finding housing and work
and establishing religious facilities, journals etc., is more or less complete. After one
generation, the number of new migrant organisations tends to decline. In the case of
the Surinamese organisations this seems to have happened, but despite this pattern
there was no such decline in the associational life of migrants from Indonesia in the
1980s. We will return to this later on. For Antillean organisations it is still too soon
to tell whether the number of newly founded organisations will decline. Thus, the
basic pattern in the evolution of the organisational landscape is shown in the graph
below (Fig. 2).
What we see here is a decline in the number of newly founded Surinamese
organisations in the mid-1980s, exactly at the time that the multicultural policies of
the Dutch government took effect. However, the number of Surinamese organisa-
tions had been rising since 1973, when the large-scale influx of Surinamese
immigrants commenced. From the early 1970s onwards, subsidies for migrant
organisations were made available at the municipal level. Most of the Surinamese
immigrants arrived between 1975 and 1979. At that time, the number of Surinamese
residents in the Netherlands was growing so rapidly that it led to a diminishing
Surinamese organisational density (i.e. a decreasing number of organisations per
capita) in Amsterdam, as Vermeulen has shown (Vermeulen 2006, 138).
The number of newly founded Surinamese organisations declined sharply in the






















































Fig. 2 Newly established migrant organisations per year. Moving three yearly average
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government sponsorship in the 1970s, we agree with Vermeulen that its declining
numbers in the 1980s was in all likelihood caused by shrinking subsidies (Vermeulen
2006, 132, 140). At the same time, many new organisations were being established
by Indische Netherlanders without government sponsorship. As we will demonstrate,
the declining numbers of newly established Surinamese organisations were related to
changing opportunity structures, whereas the rise of the migrant organisations of
first- and second-generation migrants from Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s had
little to do with multicultural government policies. Identity, trauma, heritage and
transnationalism became keywords which characterised many of the new postcolo-
nial migrant organisations of the 1980s and 1990s, and the far majority of the
immigrant associations that played a role in these areas operated outside government
sponsorship.
The number of Surinamese organisations in the graph is three or four times as
large as that of the other migrant groups. However, if we relate the number of
organisations to the size of the respective migrant populations, the picture is slightly
different. It then becomes clear that from the early 1950s onwards the Moluccans
were the most active in this field. The Moluccan self-representation as exiles and
their spatial isolation in the Netherlands had created the perfect breeding ground for
factionalism and strife. This was not unusual for smaller refugee immigrant
populations in the Netherlands, as Van Heelsum has demonstrated (Van Heelsum
2004, vol. 1, 62). In addition, the colonial army had recruited young Moluccan men
from many different islands and villages. Once in the Netherlands they were housed
in 60 different locations and clearly they presented a special case. The organisational
density of the Surinamese—and the Antilleans to lesser degree—was not out of tune
with that of the Moroccans and Turks, respectively 1:409 and 1:303 (Ibidem). In the
landscape of Dutch migrant organisations, the four large immigrant groups from
outside Western Europe (the Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans and Turks) share
approximately the same organisational density (Table 2).
The discrepancy in the organisational density of the two largest postcolonial
groups, the Indische Netherlanders and the Surinamese, is striking. Obviously, the
figures in the table above represent the organisational density in 2006 and are not
entirely comparable. But the organisational densities of Indische and Surinamese
organisations 3 years after their first and largest immigration influx differ even more
strikingly: the density of Surinamese organisations in 1978 was 1:837 and the






Fraction (over 66% of the
organisations in column 2)
Surinamese 1,223 331,900 1:411
Indische Netherlanders 338 519,000 1:2,319
Moluccan 454 58,349 1:195
Antilles/Aruba 346 129,683 1:568
Adapted from, www.iisg.nl/research/migrantenorganisaties.php
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organisational density of Indische organisations in 1952 was 1:7,304.6 This
difference can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, the ethnic and religious
diversity within the Surinamese immigrant population was considerable. Secondly,
Hindustani groups, which were part of the Surinamese migration, had to establish
their own religious facilities.7 Thirdly, opportunity structures had changed drastically
in the 25 years between the arrival of the repatriates from Indonesia around 1950 and
the immigration from Suriname around 1975. Finally, newcomers’ social capital in
terms of how to establish and maintain organisations differed significantly.
Ethnic and Religious Diversity, Social Capital and Opportunity Structures
Coming from a plural society, the Surinamese immigrants from various ethnic
backgrounds—Afro-Surinamese, Hindustani, Maroon, and Javanese—all established
their own organisations. In this respect the identity politics in the Netherlands were a
continuation of the pillarised politics of Suriname. To this it should be added that
Surinamese independence was pushed through by the Afro-Surinamese government
against fierce resistance from the Hindustani opposition. Collaboration between
Hindustani and Afro-Surinamese immigrant organisations proved to be extremely
difficult in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Bosma 2009). A second factor is that
there were no Hindu temples, and hardly any Mosques, when the Hindustani arrived
in the Netherlands. Their situation was very different from that of the Antilleans who
are mostly Catholic, or the Afro-Surinamese who are members of the Moravian
Brotherhood, which was already established in the Netherlands, or the Indische
Netherlanders who were either Protestant or Catholic. Almost half (254 out of 547)
of the Hindustani organisations are religious in character, widely exceeding the 15%
of the Moluccan and Turkish organisations and 24% of the Moroccan organisations
that are religious in character (Van Heelsum 2004, 64). This high percentage of
religious organisations among the Hindustani population is the result of a convoluted
colonial migration history. Hindustani contract labourers on Surinamese plantations
were recruited from many different villages, and therefore had many different
religious and caste backgrounds. This led to a high degree of religious fragmentation
and religious pillarisation within the Hindustani population.
The great majority of postcolonial immigrants were Dutch citizens and most of
them had received a basic education, although the Indische Netherlanders and
repatriates were by far the best educated. Both the Indische Netherlanders and the
Afro-Surinamese were highly politically mobilised in colonial times. However, the
structure of their organisations was radically different. While the Surinamese
organisations were mainly based in and just around Paramaribo, the organisations of
the Indische Netherlanders covered large parts of the Indonesian archipelago.
Indische and repatriate associations in the Netherlands could build upon their
7 The term Hindustani refers to contract labourers with various religious backgrounds who had been
recruited from India to work on the Surinamese plantations.
6 In 1978, the Surinamese population in the Netherlands amounted to 128,100 persons and the number of
Surinamese organizations was 153. Assuming that since 1945 300,000 repatriates arrived from Indonesia
in the Netherlands, the number of Indische Netherlanders living in the Netherlands in 1952 was
approximately 168,000. The number of Indische organizations in 1952 was 23.
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organisational experience in setting up branches, collecting membership fees and
circulating journals over long distances. Once in the Netherlands, the effects of the
differences in social capital were reinforced by a shift in opportunity structures from
the national to the municipal level. In order to make a proper comparison we have to
look at the first 15 years of settlement. Between 1945 and 1960 the Indische
Netherlanders and repatriates established 20 new national and only three local
organisations, whereas between 1975 and 1990 the Surinamese established 67 new
national and 330 new local organisations (of which 120 were religious institutions
and religious federal structures) (International Institute of Social History (IISH)
2008). The two most powerful organisations among these 20 Indische national
organisations had 30 to 40 local branches.8 During their years of settlement the
Surinamese immigrant organisations were far more divided than the Indische in
terms of ethnicity, scale and membership figures. In addition, Indische organisations
are usually associations with members, whereas among Surinamese migrants
foundations are more common.9 The latter type of organisation is more dependent
upon government subsidies for its survival than associations with fee-paying
members.
In the 1950s and 1960s, welfare work for the repatriates from Indonesia was co-
ordinated by a Central Committee (CCKP)—with many local committees all over
the country—in which non-governmental organisations of repatriates and the
churches worked together (Willems 2001, 102). Integration policies were co-
ordinated at the national level and the Indische organisations operated likewise. In
the 1970s, Surinamese organisations did not become involved in policymaking at a
national level but in social work at the municipal level and sometimes even in
unrewarding and dangerous activities for semi-volunteer organisations, such as
providing help for drug addicts.
The Effects of the Minorities Policies or Multicultural Policies of the 1980s
Though the ‘fragmentation and pillarisation’ of Surinamese organisations contrasts
strikingly with Indische organisational unity, it was not exceptional among migrant
groups in the Netherlands (Van Heelsum 2001). Moreover, the Surinamese diversity
was rooted in a plural colonial society and developed in the 1970s rather than in the
‘multicultural 1980s’. In fact, the minorities policies of the early 1980s tried to
restore what could be considered as the derailed immigration and settlement policies
of the Dutch government of the 1970s. The community development approach with
its strong assimilationist features had worked very well during the Indische
repatriation, which went down as a success in Dutch history. The model of the
Indische integration still dominated in the 1970s, but it met with resistance from both
Moluccan and Surinamese organisations. Moluccan organisations still held on to the
ideal of returning to a free Republic of the Moluccas and considered integration
8 This refers to Pelita and NIBEG.
9 Between 1945 and 1960, 41% (7 out of 17) of the Indische organisations were associations, and 35% (6
out of 17) were foundations. Between 1975 and 1990, 34% (174 out of 513) of the Surinamese
organisations were associations and 63% (323 out of 513) were foundations.
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policies as a threat to this ideal. Impressed by violent train hijackings by radical
young Moluccans that deeply shocked Dutch society, a compromise was found.
In 1976 the Moluccan Welfare Council was established with eight out of 19 seats
allocated to Badan Persatuan, the leading Moluccan political organisation
(Smeets and Steijlen 2006, 245). The relationship between the Surinamese
organisations and the Dutch Ministry of Welfare was rather frosty. Surinamese
organisations held on to the ideal of a return to Suriname, which in the view of the
Dutch government was unrealistic (Bosma 2009). While there had been close
collaboration between the organisations of the repatriates and the Dutch
government over the issue of housing, Surinamese spokesmen condemned the
attempts of the government to disperse the Surinamese across the Netherlands as an
attack on their newly gained sense of Surinamese nationhood (Suriname had only
become independent in 1975). There was mistrust between the Ministry of Welfare,
the Surinamese organisations and contemporary local welfare foundations staffed
by Surinamese (Bosma 2009).
The minorities policies of the early 1980s tried to break this deadlock by making
a distinction between welfare work and political empowerment. The importance of
the Dutch government talking directly to migrants themselves rather than to the
professional national welfare network was underlined (WRR 1979, 17). Or to put it
differently, the minorities policies of the early 1980s, and particularly the desire to
speak to the immigrants directly, should be seen against the backdrop of a
government struggling against powerful welfare conglomerates, which, according
to some contemporary observers, had placed themselves between the government
and the population (Van Doorn and Schuyt 1978). Moreover, there was a broad
political consensus that national welfare policies should be decentralised, a process
that had already been set in motion in the 1970s, but began to take shape seriously
from 1983 onwards.
The Dutch minorities’ policies were formulated in a sober atmosphere. Among
the postcolonial immigrant groups, unemployment among the Moluccan and
Surinamese youth increased rapidly, financial deficits in the Dutch government
soared, and with little likelihood that the Surinamese and guest workers from the
Mediterranean countries would return, there was little room for optimism. This was
happening, as Vermeulen has described for Amsterdam, alongside budget cuts and
the break-up of unified welfare organisations for specific minorities. More
organisations became eligible for funding, but with less money available (Vermeulen
2006, 134–135). The Surinamese welfare foundations were wound up and the
saturation of local socio-cultural organisations, as well as another reorientation in
minorities policy from ‘self-organisation’ towards education and employment, led—
as far as postcolonial migrant organisations were concerned—to a decline in the
number of new Surinamese organisations during the 1980s. The disenchantment
among policymakers with migrant organisations was complete in the early 1990s
(Penninx and Slijper 1999), the heydays of multiculturalism. Greater emphasis was
given to education and the employment of individuals rather than the empowerment
projects of groups of people or certain districts (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid 1989). The debate about minorities was rapidly subsumed into the
issue of ‘cumulative urban problems’, which included issues such as unemployment,
drug addiction, crime and school truancy.
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The Trauma of the Second World War in Asia
The causes of the declining number of newly established organisations and the
waning organisational interest of the Surinamese in the 1980s were rooted in the
1970s. This decline was partly the result of decentralisation and partly stemmed from
the earlier availability of government subsidies for migrant organisations at the
municipal level. This availability of funding often induced the Surinamese groups to
opt for the establishment of a foundation instead of an association, which made them
less effective in terms of mobilisation. The participation of Indische Netherlanders in
ethnic associations was still at the level of about 40% in the 1980s (Bosma 2009).
The ‘identity politics’ of the Indische organisations related to the Second World War
in Indonesia were particularly vocal and the Dutch government became increasingly
susceptible to these. The Indische Netherlanders and repatriates, who were excluded
from the multicultural policies, struggled to be included in the central chapter of
Dutch identity formation: the Second World War. One of their greatest grievances
was that their massive internment in Japanese detention camps (about 100,000 Dutch
civilians were interned and an additional 42,000 had been prisoners of war) had not
received proper recognition in Dutch society. Moreover, neither the soldiers nor the
civil servants had received any backpay from the Dutch government for the 3 years
they had spent in Japanese internment camps.
Backpay is something the Dutch government has never been willing to consider
to date, although in the 1970s and 1980s the government became more susceptible to
claims that were related to the consequences of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia
between 1942 and 1945. Both Indische Netherlanders and repatriates, as well as
Moluccans who had endured lasting physical and psychological damage from the
war, became eligible for a war victim’s allowance. Somewhat belatedly, their rights
were brought on a par with those who suffered from persecution during the German
occupation of the Netherlands. For the first time in 1970, the anniversary of the
capitulation of Japan was commemorated separately on 15 August instead of 5 May,
the day the German troops in the Netherlands had surrendered. It was conceived by
the Dutch government as the first and the last separate commemoration. But 10 years
later, another commemoration was held on 15 August. This time it was organised by
a union of 23 Indische organisations and the Moluccan Badan Persatuan. Since 1980
the separate commemoration has become a yearly event. In 1988, the victims of the
war in Asia were granted their own monument in The Hague.
As the first generation of immigrants from Indonesia was putting forward its
claims regarding the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, it also began to look back on
its youth in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the second generation of immigrants from
Indonesia became engaged in a search for its Indonesian roots. In 1982 the
Moluccan magazine Tjenkeh—edited by young Moluccan intellectuals—reported
that there was a lot of ‘nostalgia and identity strengthening’ happening (Tjenkeh
1982) Within the existing structures—mainly magazines, museums and Pasars—
there was a growing interest in colonial history and in Indonesian culture in general.
‘Indische’ became increasingly associated with history and identity. At the same
time, the Moluccan focus on Indonesia increased. And whether we take the Indische
journal Moesson, or the Moluccan Marinjo or Tjenkeh, we see the same tendency to
look back on the past. The 1980s were also the beginning of the quest to include the
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experiences of the Moluccans, descendants of slaves and the non-white Dutch from
Indonesia into Dutch history writing. The second generation from Indonesia
distanced itself from the often colonial mental make-up of most of their parents’
organisations. Second-generation Moluccan intellectuals distanced themselves from
the ideal of a Free Republic of the Moluccas. It considered this political quest as too
compromised by colonial revanchism and too focused upon the special relationship
that had existed between the Moluccans and the Dutch in the colonial army.
Following this trend, a few years later the oldest Indische journal, Moesson, had to
defend itself against criticism by Indische intellectuals that it was indulging itself in
politically insensitive colonial nostalgia. Members of the second generation created
their own organisation of ‘Indische descendants’ in order to leave colonialism behind
and relate to modern Indonesia.
In 1986, the Indische Scientific Institute was founded, the Moesson Indische
bookshop was opened, and funds for the Moluccan Museum were obtained from the
Dutch government. Indische and Moluccan groups had acted to preserve their
heritage simultaneously but completely independently from each other. The common
denominator was the realisation that soon the first generation would no longer be
alive. It also became clear that academic work on the histories of the postcolonial
immigrants was still in its infancy (Bosma 2009). A long struggle commenced for
state-commissioned histories on the immigrants from Indonesia. Prime Minister
Ruud Lubbers intervened in 1991 in favour of the writing of an Indische history,
which resulted in four volumes on the history of the Indische Netherlanders
appearing between 2001 and 2006. In 2006, a history of the Moluccans also
appeared, commissioned by the Minister for ‘Large Cities and Integration’, Rogier
van Boxtel. In the late 1990s and early 2000s various attempts were made to
establish an ‘Indische House’ for the commemoration of the War in Asia, without
much success as the institution went bankrupt twice.
However, most initiatives in the field of cultural heritage and ethnic festivals were
undertaken without government sponsorship or with only minimal subsidies. This is
particularly true for the Indische Netherlanders, who did not belong to the official
minorities. From the late 1950s onwards, an Indische cultural scene had been
developing and by the 1980s it consisted of about 30 cultural markets, the so-called
Pasar Malams, with the major event being the Pasar Malam Besar (the big evening
market) in The Hague, which attracted between 130,000 and 160,000 visitors. Also
completely outside the purview of state-sponsored organisations is the immense
library on colonial Indonesia and the flourishing ‘nostalgia’ literature. This
production of literature and the fact that one third of the Indische organisations
established since 1991 are dedicated to the past are marked features of Indische
postcolonial life (Van Leeuwen 2008; Bosma 2009).
Orientations on the Countries of Origin Emerging Independently
from Multicultural Politics
It is difficult to claim that Dutch multicultural politics have generously sponsored
cultural diversity. In the case of the postcolonial immigrants, it is in many respects
simply a myth. The establishment of the Moluccan Historical Museum and Indische
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House—both high profile initiatives—were not linked to multiculturalism, but to the
Second World War in Asia and the repatriation process itself. In contrast to the
Indische and Moluccan institutes in the field of heritage that do receive subsidies,
one might say the National Institute for the Study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy is
an outcome of multicultural policies. It was an act of memory politics by the Dutch
government, following the example of Great Britain to integrate the legacies of the
Atlantic slave trade in public memory. The ethnic festivals, however, that attract so
much media attention hardly receive government subsidies. The Indische Pasar
Malam receives no government subsidies at all and the (Afro-) Surinamese Kwakoe
festival in Amsterdam, which is attended by 400,000 visitors each year, receives a
mere pittance. In general, government subsidies for the cultural scenes of the
migrants are trivial compared with the size of the immigrant population.
In spite of these hardly conducive national opportunity structures, since the 1990s
the percentage of postcolonial migrant organisations involved in preserving their
heritage, identity and history has more than doubled (5.5% versus 2.2% before 1990)
and an even more remarkable growth took place in the number of organisations that
were oriented towards the modern country of origin (12.2% versus 3.7% before
1990). If the cultural life of postcolonial migrants has developed more or less
without government sponsorship, this is certainly the case for another set of activities
that is part of the repertoire of identity seeking, undertaking activities oriented
towards the modern country of origin. Migration historians and geographers like Van
Amersfoort usually argue that transnationalism is nothing new: if anything has
changed it is the density of relationships, made possible by new and cheaply
available means of communication and long-distance travel (Van Amersfoort 2001).
But for postcolonial migrants transnationalism is something new, or at least is taking
new directions. After all, the political relationship between their country of origin
and their new land of settlement, the former metropolis, has changed in definition.
Most postcolonial migrants were reluctant settlers on Dutch soil. The Indische
Netherlanders however could not return to their place of origin. As many as 30,000
of them migrated to the USA, another 10,000 to Australia and smaller groups to a
great number of countries all over the world.10 Moluccans only began to look
towards the Netherlands in the late 1970s when it became clear that the ideal of a
free republic of the Moluccas (the Republik Maluku Selatan) would never
materialise. Many who had left Suriname because of political instability in 1975
or the unattractive prospect of visa requirements after 1980 dreamt of returning as
soon as the situation had calmed down. But in the 1980s, the Surinamese too had to
adjust themselves towards the concept of a permanent existence in the Netherlands.
For the overwhelming majority, settlement in the Netherlands proved to be
permanent, and this implied a transformation in the relationship with their country of
origin. What remained was the solidarity with communities and relatives in back
home. In the Moluccan case, the kumpulans, or associations, began to play an
increasingly important role in this respect.11 These associations, initially meant to
maintain contact between the Moluccans dispersed across the Netherlands, over time
10 In addition, it should be noted that from 1949 to 1962 a small proportion of the Indische Netherlanders
tried to build a country in New Guinea, until this was annexed in 1962 by Indonesia.
11 The first kumpulan was registered at the Chamber of Commerce in 1952.
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began to include villages back in Indonesia. Open contact with relatives and
communities in the Moluccas came about in the late 1960s. This led to a better
understanding of the situation on Ambon and other Moluccan islands and also to the
creation of solidarity organisations (Rinsampessy 1992, 182). From the early 1970s
onwards, the Dutch government tried to encourage Moluccans in the Netherlands to
visit their relatives overseas, but the first of these ‘orientation trips’ took place only
after the second train hijacking in 1978. Once visits by Moluccans in the
Netherlands to the Moluccas had become openly accepted within the Moluccan
community in the Netherlands, a growing number of Moluccan organisations geared
towards development projects and solidarity projects in the Moluccas emerged: 9
organisations were established in the 1950s, 15 between 1960 and 1990 and 43 since
then (IISH 2008).
To help the tens of thousands of Indische Netherlanders who struggled to survive
in Indonesia in the economically and politically difficult 1950s, the organisation
HALIN (Aid to Compatriots in Need) was founded in 1955 in the Netherlands and has
supported thousands of former Dutch citizens who stayed in Indonesia. This
organisation still exists today. Once the tensions between Indonesia and its former
coloniser eased—the visit of the Dutch queen to Indonesia in 1970 was an important
step in that direction—and the cost of air fares decreased over the years, a visit to
their country of birth or to the country where they had worked for many years
became a real option. Moreover, in the course of time the orientation of the journey
became less about the colonial Indische and more oriented towards modern
Indonesia. As a concomitant to that, the solidarity of Indische organisations has
expanded beyond solidarity with relatives in Indonesia. Tong-Tong, the organiser of
the Pasar Malam Besar, the largest Indische festival in the Netherlands, recently held
benefit concerts for the Acehnese tsunami victims in 2005 and the victims of the
earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006.12
These links with Indonesia are nothing, however, compared with the increasing
intensity of the contacts with the West Indies and Suriname in particular. Its
independence did not have a negative effect on the intensity of contact between the
Surinamese in the Netherland and those in the West Indies. While in 1982, 69,000
persons arrived at Zanderij airport near Paramaribo, their numbers had doubled by
2000. The declining cost of air fares, from the equivalent of about 900 Euros in 1981
to half this amount 20 years later, was most welcome. Particularly interesting is the
economic relationship between migrants and their families’ homes. In 2006, about
47% of the families in Suriname received money from relatives in the Netherlands,
on average 100 to 500 Euros per year. The total amount involved has increased over
the years. In 2006, the total volume of remitted funds was estimated to be in the
order of 125 million Euros (Unver and Siegel 2006: 21). Moreover, Surinamese–
Hindustani organisations are both involved in Dutch development co-operation as
well as an orientation towards the Indian diaspora. This is in tune with the increasing
interest of the Surinamese Hindustani in the Netherlands in metropolitan Indian
culture.13 Some Hindustani are even making trips to India, although, according to
12 See www.pasarmalambesar.nl\festhome.html
13 See www.sevanetwork.net
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Nell, these are once in a lifetime visits, in the same way that Afro-Americans visit
West Africa (Nell 2008).
The groups who are most actively engaged in linking up with their relatives
overseas are the Moluccans and the Surinamese Maroon. This is not surprising
because in both cases their places of origin have suffered from war. More than a third
of the Maroon organisations in the Netherlands are aimed at the development of their
relatives’ communities in Suriname. This is a direct consequence of the civil war in
the hinterland of Suriname. Likewise, the violent clashes in the Moluccas in 1999
caused great concern among the Moluccans in the Netherlands and led to the
establishment of 24 solidarity groups between 1999 and 2001 (IISH 2008). Again,
this rise in transnationalism was intertwined with the quest for history and identity
and part of the growing desire of postcolonial migrants of the first and second
generation to reorient themselves towards their family roots. There has been no
relationship between this type of transnationalism and dual citizenship, for the
simple reason that practically all postcolonial immigrants only have a Dutch
passport. These reorientations took place outside the scope of Dutch multicultural
minority policies, of which like in Canada, the facility of dual citizenship has
been part.
Conclusions and Discussion
Comparing the cases of the Indische and the Surinamese organisations, we may have
to accede that, apart from a different degree of ethnic and religious heterogeneity,
government sponsorship may have caused fragmentation among immigrant
organisations. But the big caveat to the point made by Koopmans et al. is that the
rise of the number of Surinamese organisations had taken effect much earlier than
the emergence of multiculturalism. Government subsidies were more easily available
in the early 1970s, a decade before multiculturalism began to inform government
policies, and ethnic divisions within the Surinamese population were the product of a
pluralistic colonial society. Surinamese and Indische immigrants differed in social
capital but also found different opportunity structures, and these reinforced the other
and played out in a remarkable difference of scale of their organisations. While
multiculturalism has definitely impacted upon the organisational life of postcolonial
migrants, Dutch government policies, as far as they can be considered to be
multicultural, have had a very limited impact, precisely because these policies
involved cutbacks in the subsidies given to migrant organisations in the 1980s. The
theory of organisational ecology submits that the number of newly founded
organisations develop in a curve. This theory however imparts an important role to
opportunity structures and assumes that they provide the necessary but limited
resources for organisations. The second curve of Indische/repatriated and Moluccan
organisations contradicts the assumption of limited resources and should be
explained in terms of a specific historical trajectory.
In sum, our data concerning the Dutch postcolonial immigrants do not support the
position that politics of multiculturalism have excessively sponsored migrant
organisations causing their fragmentation and having adverse consequences for these
organisations’ effectiveness and thus for the processes of political incorporation of
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immigrants at large. This conclusion may underline the importance of other research
into the conditions under which government assistance to immigrant organisations can
positively impact processes of social and political incorporation of newcomers. In
contrast to our case study, such research should be based upon different categories of
immigrants and different countries. In this respect, reference can be made to
Bloemraad’s work on North America (Bloemraad 2006a, b) for example.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Alba, R. D., & Nee, V. (2003). Remaking the American mainstream: assimilation and contemporary
migration. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Beets, G et al. (2002) De demografische geschiedenis van de Indische Nederlanders. Report no. 64, 89
(111, 113). The Hague: NiDi
Bloemraad, I. (2006a). Becoming a citizen in the United States and Canada: structured mobilization and
immigrant political incorporation. Social Forces, 85(2), 667–695.
Bloemraad, I. (2006b). Becoming a citizen: incorporating immigrants and refugees in the United States
and Canada. Berkeley: University of California Press. etc.
Böcker, A., & Thränhardt, D. (2003). Is het Duitse integratiebeleid succesvoller, en zo ja, waarom.
Migrantenstudies, 19(1), 33–44.
Bosma, U. (2009). Terug uit de koloniën. Bert Bakker: Zestig jaar postkoloniale migranten en hun
organisaties. Amsterdam.
Calhoun, G (ed.) (1994) Social theory and the politics of identity. Oxford: Blackwell
Campfens, H. (1979). The integration of ethno-cultural minorities: a pluralist approach. The Netherlands
and Canada: a comparative analysis of policy and programme. The Hague: Ministry of CRM/
Staatsuitgeverij.
Engelen, E. (2008). Review symposium: contested citizenship: immigration and cultural diversity in
Europe by Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Guigni and Florence Passy: through a looking
glass, darkly. Ethnicities, 8(1), 128–133.
Fennema, M. (2004). The concept and measurement of ethnic community. Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies, 30(3), 429–447.
Gunew, S. (1997). Postcolonialism and multiculturalism: between race and ethnicity. The Yearbook of
English Studies, 27, 22–39.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1989). Organizational ecology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
International Institute of Social History (IISH) (2008) Database postcolonial migrant organisations, version
13 June 08.
Jones, G. (2007). Tussen Onderdanen, Rijksgenoten en Nederlanders. Nederlandse politici over burgers
uit Oost en West en Nederland 1945–2005. Amsterdam: Rozenberg.
Kastoryano, R. (2008). Contested citizenship. Ethnicities, 8(1), 133–139.
Koopmans, R. (2002). Zachte heelmeesters’.... Een vergelijking van de resultaten van het Nederlandse en
Duitse integratiebeleid en wat de WRR daaruit niet concludeert. Migrantenstudies, 18(2), 87–92.
Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). Contested citizenship. Immigration and
cultural diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kraak, J. H., et al. (1958). De repatriëring uit Indonesië. Een onderzoek naar de integratie van de
gerepatrieerden uit Indonesië in de Nederlandse samenleving. Amsterdam: Instituut voor Sociaal
Onderzoek van het Nederlandse Volk.
Minkoff, D. (1995). Organizing for equality. The evolution of women’s and racial-ethnic organisations in
America (pp. 1955–1985). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Nell, L., (2008) Transnational migrant politics in the Netherlands. Historical structures and current
events. Ph.D. thesis, Amsterdam, December
282 U. Bosma, M. Alferink
Penninx, R., & Schrover, M. (2001). Bastion of bindmiddel? Organisaties van migranten in historisch
perspectief. Amsterdam: Instituut voor Migratie en Etnische Studies.
Penninx, R., & Slijper, B. (1999). Voor elkaar? Integratie, vrijwilligerswerk en organisaties van
migranten. Amsterdam: IMES.
Penninx, R., & van Heelsum., A. (2004). Bondgenoot of spelbreker? Organisaties van immigranten en
hun mogelijke rol in integratieprocessen. Utrecht: Forum
Prins, B. (2002). The nerve to break taboos: new realism in the Dutch discourse on multiculturalism.
Journal of International Migration and Integration (JIMI), 3(3 and 4), 363–379.
Rinsampessy, E. (1992). Saudara Bersaudara. Molukse identiteit in processen van cultuurverandering.
Assen: Van Gorcum.
Scheffer, P. (2000) ‘Het multiculturele drama’, NRC Handelsblad, 29 January
Smeets, H., & Steijlen, F. (2006). In Nederland gebleven. De geschiedenis van Molukkers 1951–2006.
Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (SCP). (2007). Jaarrapport Integratie 2007. The Hague: Sociaal Cultureel
Planbureau.
Tillie, J., & Fennema, M. (1997). Turkse organisaties in Amsterdam: een netwerkanalyse. Amsterdam: Het
Spinhuis.
Tjenkeh (1982). Onafhankelijk Moluks Maandblad (1978–1986).
Unver, Brigitte and Melissa Siegel (2006) The Netherlands-Suriname Corridor for Worker’s Remittances.
Study prepared for the World Bank and the Dutch Ministry of Finance. Utrecht, 2006
Van Amersfoort, H. (2001). Transnationalisme, moderne diaspora’s en sociale cohesie. Amsterdam:
Instituut voor Migratie en Etnische Studies (NWO Essay).
Van Amersfoort, H., & van Niekerk, M. (2006). Immigration as a colonial inheritance: post-colonial
immigrants in the Netherlands, 1945-2002. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(3), 323–346.
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (1981) Ontwerp-minderhedennota. ‘s-Gravenhage: Ministerie van
Binnenlandse Zaken.
Van Doorn, J. A. A., & Schuyt, C. J. M. (1978). De stagnerende verzorgingsstaat. Meppel: Boom.
Van Heelsum, A. (2001). Marokkaanse organisaties in Nederland. Een netwerkanalyse. Amsterdam: Het
Spinhuis.
Van Heelsum, Anja (2004) Migrantenorganisaties in Nederland, vol. 2. Utrecht: Forum
Van Leeuwen, L. (2008). Ons Indisch Erfgoed. Zestig jaar strijd om cultuur en identiteit. Amsterdam: Bert
Bakker.
Van Niekerk, M. (2002). Premigration legacies and immigrant social mobility: the Afro-Surinamese and
Indo-Surinamese in the Netherlands. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Vermeulen, Floris (2006) The immigrant organizing process. Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and
Berlin and Surinamese organizations in Amsterdam 1960–2000. IMISCOE Dissertations. Amsterdam:
AUP.
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (1989) Allochtonenbeleid. ‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsuitge-
verij.
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) (1979), Etnische Minderheden, 17, 1979. The
Hague: Staatsuitgeverij
Willems, W. (2001). De uittocht uit Indië, 1945–1995. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Ulbe Bosma is Senior Researcher at the International Institute of Social History. He published on colonial
and postcolonial history. Among his most recent publications are (with Remco Raben) Being ‘Dutch’ in
the Indies. A History of Creolisation and Empire 1500–1920 (2007), Terug uit de Koloniën. Zestig jaar
postkoloniale migranten en hun organisaties (2009) (Back from the Colonies. Sixty years postcolonial
migrants and their organisations).
Marga Alferink has studied Social Anthropology at Leiden University. As an assistant researcher at the
International Institute of Social History, she compiled the database of postcolonial migrant organisations
on which this article is based. In addition, she wrote an article on the impact of multicultural policies on
postcolonial festivals in the Netherlands (under review). Currently, she is preparing a study on the process
of integration on an allotment garden in Leiden.
Multiculturalism and Settlement 283
